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that violence could return if 'politics are not shown to be making progress' (BBC News, 2014) . The gravity of paralysis at the heart of government was not lost on Northern Ireland's leaders. In a frank admission, First Minister Peter Robinson deemed Stormont 'no longer fit for purpose' (Robinson, 2014) . Attempting to avert the outright collapse of Northern Ireland's devolved institutions, the British and Irish governments took a more interventionist approach by jointly convening fresh talks.
These talks bore tentative fruit: all five parties of the Executive signed the Stormont House Agreement in December 2014 (Northern Ireland Office, 2014) . It constituted some progress on the 'conflict' issues of flags, parading and the past, as well as additional issues of institutional and welfare reform.
However, the implementation of Stormont House was derailed by two critical developments. First, Sinn Féin decided to block the passage of the Welfare Reform
Bill through the Assembly, arguing that it did not offer sufficient protection for the most vulnerable in society (BBC News, 2015a) . The then Finance Minister Arlene
Foster warned that a failure to reach agreement on welfare reform would result in an unsustainable £500 million black hole in the Executive's budget (BBC News, 2015b Party, 2015) . 3 The move placed pressure on Sinn Féin to clarify its commitment to the democratic process, and on the DUP to consider its own position in a power-sharing Executive with Sinn Féin. Accordingly, the former reaffirmed the IRA to be 'gone and not coming back' (Sinn Féin, 2015) . The latter, meanwhile, responded with the creative use of procedural tactics to prevent the Executive from holding a meeting. To some, the move was a clever way of holding Sinn Féin accountable for republican paramilitarism without risking the outright collapse of the Assembly; to its critics, the DUP was accused of playing 'a new version of the Hokey Cokey' (BBC News, 2015c).
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In predictable fashion, the result of these twin crises was a new series of interparty talks. The two largest parties worked out their differences to reach the Fresh Start Agreement (Northern Ireland Office, 2015 Start as a 'half-baked' deal that failed to deal with the legacy of the past (BBC News, 2015d). The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) argued that Sinn Féin conceded too much on welfare reform, and the Ulster Unionists described the agreement as 'anything but' a fresh start (Rainey, 2015) . Unsurprisingly, the most scathing criticism of the deal came from arch-critic of power-sharing and leader of the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV), Jim Allister: 'Such was the DUP's desperation to delay an election that any deal would do' in order to 'cling' to power (Belfast Telegraph, 2015) . The pre-election stalls were set. The DUP and Sinn Féin had renewed their vows, while their challengers would seek to portray their governing partnership as a failed marriage of convenience.
The campaign
As in previous elections in Northern Ireland, ethno-national divisions organised competition within the respective unionist and nationalist blocs to generate a largely intra-communal contest (see, for example, Evans and Tonge, 2009 The Ulster Unionists accused the DUP and Sinn Féin of 'arrogance' for portraying the Assembly election as a mere two-horse race (Manley, 2016a) .
Declaring his own ambition to be First Minister, Mike Nesbitt put education at the heart of the UUP's manifesto, vowing to do more to promote integrated education and introduce a new transfer system for primary school pupils. The SDLP's flagship campaign announcement also focused on social policy. In a withering critique of child poverty and children growing up in homes with little savings or assets, Colum
Eastwood announced his party's plans to give newborn children a £500 payment towards future savings (Social Democratic and Labour Party, 2016 The BBC accordingly hosted a special televised debate in which an audience of 18-year-olds could pose their questions to representatives of the five main parties.
Beyond an initial discussion on the continued relevance of the 'green versus orange' divide, two issues sparked intense interest: abortion and same-sex marriage. These issues also emerged in the party leader debates, but it would be reasonable to suggest asymmetrical salience of these issues between younger and older age cohorts. while the DUP's Simon Hamilton has since refused to say which way he voted in the referendum, leading to speculation that he supported Remain (BBC News, 2016b).
Given the UUP's longstanding quest to differentiate itself from the DUP, its failure to accentuate a distinct position on Europe was perhaps an early sign that the smaller unionist party had not yet done enough to present itself as a convincing alternative to its larger rival.
The results
The results brought little in the way of change at Stormont, with the mutual dominance of the DUP and Sinn Féin over their respective ethno-national rivals undiminished. For the DUP in particular the election proved nothing short of a triumph. Even with a drop in its first preference vote share, the party matched its 2011 tally of 38 seats (see Table 1 ). Such an outcome confounded widely held expectations that the party would sustain some losses, mainly due to 38 seats being considered a non-replicable high water mark. The party's two-headed campaign strategy of emphasising Arlene Foster's personal (bordering on presidential) appeal while simultaneously rolling out the tried and tested bogey-man of a Sinn Féin First
Minister clearly proved a highly effective one. Its adroitness at vote management under PR-STV was also, as in previous contests, exemplary. Eighty-six percent of DUP candidates were elected, a figure that also accounts for a head-to-head contest between two rival DUP candidates in Mid Ulster.
<< TABLE 1 HERE >>
DUP success meant inevitable disappointment for its principal electoral rival, the UUP. By only matching its 16-seat haul from 2011, the party failed to make the in-roads into the unionist vote that many had predicted. Indeed, the UUP recorded its lowest ever vote share ( One positive for the SDLP could be found in its avoidance of even greater losses. A leaked internal party report from 2015 had prophesied a loss of five seats (Manley, 2015) . A more positive reading of the SDLP's election might also consider the slight regeneration of its Assembly team, with several long-serving incumbents replaced by younger colleagues. It would be safe to say, however, that the main challenges for the party moving forward concern more fundamental matters, such as message and purpose, than personnel. Rather, the increase in the number of female candidates standing for election across all parties, and in winnable seats, played a more plausible and decisive role in moving the Assembly towards a more progressive direction.
Executive formation
The process and choreography of forming an executive were transformed by the Stormont House and Fresh Start agreements and new legislation establishing opposition structures and necessitating pre-coalition agreement on a draft Programme for Government (PfG). This legislation also set a deadline of two weeks after the first meeting of the new Assembly for the nomination of ministers. Following the count, speculation quickly mounted about the respective willingness of the UUP and SDLP to enter into a governing coalition with the DUP and Sinn Féin. All-party negotiations over the PfG lasted two days before the UUP announced that it could not sign up to the programme and, as a result, it would be entering into opposition. Mike Nesbitt, therefore, became the first official leader of the opposition at Stormont since 1972.
With Nesbitt's cry of 'let battle commence', the spotlight immediately swung to the SDLP's position (Devenport, 2016) . This was arguably a more torturous decision for the SDLP than the UUP, not least because of the symbolism of a nationalist party Her appointment brings the total number of women around the Executive table to four (40 percent), the highest it has ever been.
Conclusion
The 2016 Northern Ireland has entered a new era. 
Tables

